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Abstract. In this paper we extend a formal framework presented in [6] to model
reasoning across legal systems. In particular, we propose a logical system that en-
compasses the various interpretative interactions occurring between legal systems
in the context of private international law. This is done by introducing meta-rules
to reason with interpretive canons.
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1. Introduction
Developing formal methods to study legal reasoning and interpretation is a traditional
topic of AI and Law (cf., e.g., [4,6,8] and [5] for an overview). The topic has been ad-
dressed using argumentation tools, both formally and informally; though, these research
efforts had concentrated on interpretive issues arising within one legal system, keeping
a mainly inward outlook. An examination of the literature reveals that also interactions
among distinct normative systems had interested some scholars in both legal theory and
AI and Law with regard to the allocation of jurisdiction and choice-of-law characteris-
ing private international law cases. The issues of legal pluralism and the fundamental
mechanisms of conflict of laws had consequently been studied through argumentation
and logics [7,2,3], but the focus had been maintained on legal dogmatics or at the level of
virtual conflicts between legal systems, each considered as potentially competent to rule
the case: precisely the kind of conflicts that private international law in fact prevents.
Hence, no specific consideration had been given so far to the issue of application of
canons and interpretation of the foreign provision when, e.g., the conflicting rule identi-
fies it as the applicable law to the particular case in front of national judges. Filling this
gap in the literature, the present paper builds on the research hypothesis, according to
which those virtual conflicts between normative systems, avoided by private international
law, can still occur at the level of interpretation and of interpretive canons. In spite of the
difficulties faced to get acquainted with both foreign law content and its interpretation,
domestic courts are nevertheless required to apply it as if they were the foreign court, as
it happens, e.g., in the Italian legal system. Indeed, applying a foreign piece of legislation
within the domestic legal system means to tackle conceptual misalignments, to deal with
normative or interpretive gaps, and to solve clashes between canons of interpretation.
1Supported by the EU H2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant
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This paper aims at developing a fresh logical framework, based on Defeasible Logic
(DL), which properly addresses the research issue of reasoning about interpretive canons
across different legal systems. The proposed framework extends the contribution of [6].
The layout of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the theoretical context of our
framework, the specific problem we address, and offers an example; Section 3 presents a
simplified version of one of the variants of DL of [6]; Section 4 proposes the new system
extending the logic of Section 3 to handle the interpretation of legal provisions across
legal systems.
2. Reasoning across Legal Systems: The Case of Private International Law
When applying and interpreting the foreign law in cross-border disputes, domestic courts
are required to behave as if they were the foreign court and, at the same time, to protect
the inner coherence of their own legal system: this raises interpretive doubts of many
kinds. From an argumentation perspective, for instance, applying the same canon of in-
terpretation to the same normative provision and obtaining opposite outcomes in differ-
ent legal systems could correspond to incompatible arguments and, thus, requires for ef-
fective ways to cope with them in the national system. The purpose of this paper is to
offer a formal method to model how domestic courts should reason about foreign law
by handling conflicting interpretive arguments that are relevant to interpret the identified
foreign law. Reasoning in the context of private international law and of interpretation of
the foreign law means to consider also that:
• canons of interpretation refer to at least two legal systems, the domestic and the
foreign one, but both systems may consist of normative sub-systems, and may be
part of larger systems, e.g., EU system: assuming the existence of many legal sys-
tems LSi, . . . ,LSz, from a set-theoretical perspective, each LSi is either included
in or including other systems (more and more often, both cases hold), with which
it is in various relations;
• in the foreign legal system, priority may be given to interpretive arguments that
are hardly or not used in the domestic one (e.g., the argument from precedent,
common in the USA, is not so familiar to civil law courts);
• interpretive conditions may change from one system to the other;
• an ordering among all interpretations has to be made: this will depend on the legal
system taken as main reference and on the goals and values it refers to.
Summing up, private international law states the principle that courts in a given
system have to apply (and somehow import) the law from other systems. This requires
sometimes to also use foreign interpretive standards and canons (see, for the Italian case,
Article 15 of legislative act 218/1995). We will illustrate our method by elaborating the
following real example.
Example 1 A woman, Cameroonian citizen, put forward an Italian court a paternity ac-
tion with respect to her daughter, also Cameroonian citizen, underage at the time, on
the basis of article 340 Cameroonian Civil Code and article 33 law no. 218/1995. She
alleged that the child was born within a relationship she had with an Italian citizen,
who initially took care of the girl and provided financial support for her, then refusing
to recognise the child. The judicial question is thus the recognition of the legitimate pa-
ternity in favour of the girl, whose main legal consequence would be to burden the pre-
sumed father with the duty to give her due support in the form of maintenance and edu-
cation. Art. 340, Civil Code of Cameroon, states that the judicial declaration of paternity
outside marriage can only be done if the suit is filed within the two years that follow
the cessation, either of the cohabitation, or of the participation of the alleged father in
the support [entretien] and education of the child. At a first glance, it appears crucial to
properly interpret the term entretien for it represents a condition for lawfully advancing
the judicial request of paternity. Different interpretations of this term can be offered in
Cameroon’s law, and may fit differently within the Italian leal system.
3. Defeasible Logic for Reasoning about Canons
In [6] we proposed two variants of Defeasible Logic for reasoning about interpretive
canons. Let us recall here the simplest one, in which we further simplify language and
proof theory for space reasons. This framework handles the overall meaning of legal pro-
visions intended as argumentative, abstract (i.e., non-analysed) logical units. The follow-
ing basic components (among others) are introduced:
• a set of legal provisions n1,n2, . . . to be interpreted;
• as set of literals a,b, . . . , corresponding to any sentences, which can be used to of-
fer a sentential meaning to any provision n (a literal a is the meaning of provision
n);
• a set of interpretative acts or interpretations I1, I2, . . . (literal interpretation, teleo-
logical interpretation, etc.) that return for any legal provision a sentential meaning
for it;
• a set of rules encoding interpretive arguments (i.e., rules that state what interpre-
tive act can be obtained under suitable conditions); these rules expresses modes
of reasoning within any given legal system.
Definition 1 (Language) Let PROP = {a,b, . . .} be a set of propositional atoms,
NORM= {n1,n2, . . .} a set of legal provisions, INTR= {I1,I2, . . .} a set of interpreta-
tion functions (for example, denoting literal interpretation, etc.), MOD= {OBL,Adm} a
set of modal operators whereOBL is the modality for denoting obligatory interpretations
and interpretation outcomes and Adm for denoting the admissible ones.
1. The set L= PROP∪{¬p | p ∈ PROP} denotes the set of literals.
2. The complementary of a literal q is denoted by ∼q; if q is a positive literal p,
then ∼q is ¬p, and if q is a negative literal ¬p, then ∼q is p.
3. The set ModLit= {a,¬a|a ∈ L, ∈MOD} denotes the set of modal literals.
4. The set INT= {Ii(n,a),¬Ii(n,a)|∃Ii : NORM → L ∈ INTR :Ii(n) = a} denotes
the set of interpretive acts and their negations: an expression Ii(n,a), for instance,
means that the interpretation Ii of provision n returns that the literal a is the case.
5. The complementary ∼φ of an interpretation φ is defined as follows: 2
φ ∼φ
Ii(n,a) ∼Ii(n,a) ∈ {¬Ii(n,a), Ii(n,b), I j(n,c)|a = b,a = c}
¬Ii(n,a) ∼¬Ii(n,a) = Ii(n,a).
2This does not cover cases where, e.g., a is semantically included in b, which was considered in [6].
We will also use the notation ±Ii(n,a) to mean respectively Ii(n,a) and ∼Ii(n,a).
Hence, ∼± Ii(n,a) means ∓Ii(n,a).
6. The set of qualified interpretations is ModIntr = {φ ,¬φ |φ ∈ INT,  ∈
MOD}.
7. The complementary of a modal literal or qualified interpretation l is defined as
follows (φ ∈ L∪ INT):
l ∼l
OBLφ ∼OBLφ ∈ {¬OBLφ ,OBL∼φ ,Adm∼φ ,¬Admφ}
¬OBLφ ∼¬OBLφ = OBLφ
Admφ ∼Admφ ∈ {¬Admφ ,OBL∼φ}
¬Admφ ∼¬Admφ = Admφ
We use defeasible rules and defeaters3 [1] to reason about the interpretations of
provisions; these rules contain literals, interpretations and qualified interpretations in
their antecedent, and interpretations in their consequents.
Definition 2 (Interpretation Rules) Let Lab be a set of arbitrary labels. The set RuleI
of interpretation rules contains rules is of the type
r : A(r) ↪→X C(r)
where (a) r ∈ Lab is the name of the rule; (b) A(r) = {φ1, . . . ,φn}, the antecedent (or
body) of the rule is such that each φi is either a literal l ∈ L, a modal literal Y ∈ModLit,
or a qualified interpretation X ∈ModIntr; (c) ↪→∈{⇒I ,I} denotes the type of the rule
(if ↪→ is ⇒I , the rule is a defeasible rule, while if ↪→ isI , the rule is a defeater); (d)
C(r) = ψ is the consequent (or head) of the rule, where ψ ∈ INT is an interpretation.
Example 2 Consider the following provision from the Italian penal code:
Art. 575. Homicide. Whoever causes the death of a man [uomo] is punishable by no less than
21 years in prison.
Consider now that paragraph 1 of art. 3 of the Italian constitution reads as follows:
Art. 3. All citizens have equal social status and are equal before the law, without regard to
their sex, race, language, religion, political opinions, and personal or social conditions.
The interpretation Is (interpretation from substantive reasons4) of art. 3 leads to c, which
corresponds to the following sentence:
All persons have equal social status and are equal before the law, without regard to their sex,
race, language, religion, political opinions, and personal or social conditions.
The following interpretation defeasible rule could be:
r1 : kill adult,kill female,OBL Is(art.3,c)⇒I Ic(art.575,b)
where b=“Whoever causes the death of a person is punishable by no less than 21 years
in prison”. In other words, if art. 3 of the Italian constitution states formal equality before
3A defeater is a rule which prevents opposite conclusions without allowing to positively deriving anything.
4An argument from substantive reasons states that, if there is some goal that can be considered to be funda-
mentally important to the legal system, and if the goal can be promoted by one rather than another interpretation
of the statutory provision, then the provision should be interpreted in accord with the goal.
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the law without regard also to gender identity, then b is the best interpretation outcome
of art. 575 of the penal code, with Ic denoting, for example, interpretation by coherence.
Given a set of rules R, RI and R
I⇒ denote, respectively, the sets of all defeaters and
defeasible rules in the set R; RI [φ ] is the set of rules with the interpretation φ in the head.
Definition 3 (Interpretation theory) An Interpretation TheoryD is a structure (F,R,>),
where F, the set of facts, is a set of literals, modal literals, and qualified interpretations,
R is a set of interpretation rules and >, the superiority relation, is a binary relation over
R.
An interpretation theory corresponds to a knowledge base providing us with inter-
pretive arguments about legal provisions. The superiority relation is used for conflicting
rules, i.e., rules whose conclusions are complementary.
Example 3 The following theory reconstructs a very simple interpretive toy scenario in
the Italian legal system. Assume that a = “Whoever causes the death of a adult male
person is punishable by no less than 21 years in prison” and that Il stands for literal
interpretation or from ordinary meaning.
F = {kill adult,kill female,OBL Is(art.3,c)}
R= {r1 : kill adult,kill female,OBL Is(art.3,c)⇒I Ic(art.575,b),
r2 :⇒I Il(art.575,a)}
>= {r1 > r2}
Rule r1 has been already introduced above. Rule r2 establishes by default that art. 575
be literally interpreted as a. However, when r1 is applicable, it prevails over r2.
Let us now present the proof theory.
Definition 4 (Proofs) A proof P in an interpretation theory D is a linear sequence
P(1) . . .P(n) of tagged expressions in the form of +∂ Iφ and −∂ Iφ (with φ ∈ INT and
 ∈MOD), +∂l and −∂l (with l ∈ L and  ∈MOD), where P(1) . . .P(n) satisfy the
proof conditions below5.
The tagged interpretation +∂ Iφ means that the interpretation φ is defeasibly provable
in D with modality , while −∂ Iφ means that φ is defeasibly refuted with modality .
The tagged literal +∂l means that l is defeasibly provable in D with modality , while
−∂l means that l is defeasibly refuted with modality . The initial part of length n of a
proof P is denoted by P(1..n).
Notice that an interpretation can be admissible or obligatory. For instance, I of n
is admissible, if it is provable using a defeasible interpretation rule; it is obligatory, if
this interpretation of n is the only one admissible [6]. Let us work on the conditions for
deriving qualified interpretations.
Definition 5 A rule r ∈ RI is applicable in the proof P at P(n+1) iff for all ai ∈ A(r):
5For space reasons, we present only the positive conditions (+∂ Iφ and +∂l); see [6].
1. if ai =ψ , ψ ∈ INT, then +∂ Iψ ∈ P(1..n) with  ∈MOD;
2. if ai = ¬ψ then −∂ Iψ ∈ P(1..n) with  ∈MOD;
3. if ai =l, l ∈ L, then +∂l ∈ P(1..n);
4. if ai = ¬l, l ∈ L, then −∂l ∈ P(1..n);
5. if ai = l ∈ L then l ∈ F or ∃Ii∃n :+∂ IIi(n, l) ∈ P(1..n).
A rule r ∈ RI is discarded iff ∃ai ∈ A(r) such that
1. if ai =ψ , , ψ ∈ INT, then −∂ Iψ ∈ P(1..n) with  ∈MOD;
2. if ai = ¬ψ , ψ ∈ INT, then +∂ Iψ ∈ P(1..n) with  ∈MOD;
3. if ai =l, l ∈ L, then −∂l ∈ P(1..n);
4. if ai = ¬l, l ∈ L, then +∂l ∈ P(1..n);
5. if ai = l ∈ L then l ∈ F and ∀Ii∀n :−∂ IIi(n, l) ∈ P(1..n).
Let us define the proof conditions for +∂Adm.
+∂ IAdm: If P(n+1) = +∂ IAdmφ then
(1) Admφ ∈ F or OBLφ ∈ F , or
(2.1) ∼Admφ ∈ F , and
(2.2) ∃r ∈ RI⇒[φ ]: r is applicable, and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼φ ], either
(2.3.1) s is discarded, or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ R[φ ,k]:
t is applicable and t > s.
+∂Adm: If P(n+1) = +∂Adml then
(1) Adml ∈ F or OBLl ∈ F , or
(2) ∃Ii ∈ INT,∃n ∈ NORM :
+∂ IAdmIi(n, l) ∈ P(1..n).
To show that an interpretation φ is defeasibly provable as an admissible interpreta-
tion, there are two ways: (1) Admφ or OBLφ are a fact, or (2) Admφ must be derived by
the rules of the theory. In the second case, three conditions must hold: (2.1) any com-
plementary of Admφ does belong to the facts; (2.2) there must be a rule introducing the
admissibility for φ which can apply; (2.3) every rule s for ∼φ is either discarded or de-
feated by a stronger rule for φ . The result l of an interpretation is admissible if this is a
fact, or if there is an applicable rule proving an interpretation supporting l.
Proof conditions for ±∂OBL are much easier but we need to work on the fact
that φ is an interpretation of any given provision n and we have to make explicit its
structure. Indeed, that an interpretation Ii for the provision n is obligatory means that
Ii is admissible and that no other (non-conflicting) interpretations for n is admissible.
+∂ IOBL: If P(n+1) = +∂
I
OBL± Ii(n,a) then
(1) OBL± Ii(n,a) ∈ F or
(2.1) ∼OBL± Ii(n,a) ∈ F , and
(2.2) +∂ IAdm ± Ii(n,a) ∈ P(1..n), and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[±Im(n,b)]:
Im(n,b) =∼Ii(n,a), either
(2.3.1) s is discarded, or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ R[∼± Im(n,b),k]:
t is applicable and t > s.
+∂OBL: If P(n+1) = +∂OBLl then
(1) OBLl ∈ F , or
(2) ∃n ∈ NORM:
(2.1) ∃Ii ∈ INT : +∂ IAdmIi(n,a) ∈ P(1..n)
and
(2.2) ∀I j ∈ INT, −∂ IAdmIi(n,x) ∈ P(1..n)
if x = a.
Example 4 Consider the theory in Example 3. Facts make rule r1 applicable. Rule r2
has an empty antecedent, so it is applicable, too. The theory assumes that r1 is stronger
than r2, thus we would obtain+∂ IAdmIc(art.575,b) (and so−∂ IAdmIl(art.575,a)).Trivially,
we also get +∂ IOBLIc(art.3,c), and +∂
I
OBLIc(art.575,b) is also the case because it is the
only admissible interpretation of art. 575. We also have +∂c and +∂b, where  ∈
{Adm,OBL}.
4. Defeasible Logic for Reasoning about Canons across Legal Systems
Let us now develop a fresh logical framework which properly addresses the research is-
sues outlined in Section 2 and which extends the machinery of Section 3. In this perspec-
tive, reasoning about interpretive canons across legal systems requires
• to specify to which legal systems legal provisions belong and in which legal sys-
tem canons are applied;
• the introduction of meta-rules to reason about interpretation rules;
• that such meta-rules support the derivation of interpretation rules; in other words,
the head of meta-rules are interpretation rules, while the the antecedents may
include any conditions.
Consider, for instance, the following abstract rule:
r : (OBLILSit (n
LSi
1 , p),a⇒C (s : OBLI
LS j
s (n
LSi
2 ,d)⇒I I
LS j
c (n
LSi
1 , p)))
Meta-rule r states that, if (a) it is obligatory the teleological interpretation (It ) in legal
system LSi of legal provision n1 belonging to that system and returning p, and (b) a holds,
then the interpretive canon to be applied in legal system LS j for n1 is the interpretation
by coherence, which returns p as well, but which is conditioned in LS j by the fact that
n2 in this last system is interpreted by substantive reasons as d. In other words, r allows
for importing interpretive results from LSi into LS j in regard to the legal provision n1 in
LSi which can be applied in LS j.
Definition 1 requires a few adjustments: Definition 6 only specifies the aspects that
are changed in the language.
Definition 6 (Language 2) Let LS = {LS1, . . . ,LSm} be the set of legal systems and
⋃
1≤i≤mNORMLSi = {nLSi1 ,nLSi2 . . .} the set of legal provisions for each legal system.
1. The set INT = {ILSki (nLS j ,a),¬ILSki (nLS j ,a)|∃Ii : NORMLS j → L ∈ INTR :
Ii(nLS j) = a} denotes the set of interpretive acts and their negations.
2. The complementary of an interpretation φ is denoted by ∼φ and is defined as
follows (where, possibly, j = k):
φ ∼φ
I
LS j
i (n
LSk ,a) ∼ILS ji (nLSk ,a) ∈ {¬I
LS j
i (n
LSk ,a), I
LS j
i (n
LSk ,b), I
LS j
s (nLSk ,c)
ILSmi (n
LSk ,b), ILSms (n
LSk ,c)|a = b,a = c}
¬ILS ji (nLSk ,a) ∼¬I
LS j
i (n
LSk ,a) = I
LS j
i (n
LSk ,a).
Definition 7 (Rules) Let RuleIatom be the set of rules of Definition 26. The set RuleI of
rules is defined as
RuleI = RuleIatom∪
{¬(r : φ1, . . . ,φn ↪→ ψ)|(r : φ1, . . . ,φn ↪→ ψ) ∈ RuleIatom, ↪→∈ {⇒I ,I}}
6Atomic rules do not substantially change, except for the notation for interpretations in Definition 6.
By convention, if r is a rule, ∼r denotes the complementary rule (if r : φ1, . . . ,φn ↪→ ψ
then ∼r is ¬(r : φ1, . . . ,φn ↪→ ψ); and if r : ¬(r : φ1, . . . ,φn ↪→ ψ) then ∼r is r :
φ1, . . . ,φn ↪→ ψ).
Definition 8 (Meta-rules) Let Lab be a set of labels. RuleC = RuleCd ∪RuleC is the set
of meta-rules such that
RuleCd = {r : φ1, . . . ,φn ⇒C ψ|r ∈ Lab,A(r)⊆ L∪ModLit∪ModIntr,ψ ∈ RuleI}
RuleC = {r : φ1, . . . ,φnC ψ|r ∈ Lab,A(r)⊆ L∪ModLit∪ModIntr,ψ ∈ RuleI}
Definition 9 (Interpretation theory 2) An Interpretation Theory D is a structure
(F,RI ,RC,>), where F, the set of facts, is a set of literals, modal literals, and qualified
interpretations, RI is a set of interpretation rules, RC is a set of meta-rules, and >, the
superiority relation, is a binary relation over R such that >⊆ (RX ×RY )∪ (RC ×RC),
where RX = {C(r)|r ∈ RC[s],s ∈ Ruleatom}.
In the rest of the paper, to make our presentation more readable, we will omit defeasible
arrows for defeasible nested-rules r⇒C with the empty body. That is, a defeasible nested
rule ⇒C (p⇒I q) will be just represented as p⇒I q.
Before providing proof procedures to derive rules, let us
• introduce specific proof tags for this purpose. Remember that ↪→ denotes either
⇒ or  to simplify our presentation. ±∂Cr↪→ means that rule r ∈ RI is (is not)
defeasibly provable using meta-rules;
• highlight that applicability conditions for meta-rules are exactly as in Definition
5, because the body of meta-rules do not differ from those of interpretation rules.
Defeasible derivations of non-nested rules are based on the following procedures.
The general rationale behind the following proof conditions recalls what we discussed
in regard to the provability of literals. The proof of a rule runs as usual in three phases.
We have to find an argument in favour of the rule we want to prove. Second, all counter-
arguments are examined (rules for the opposite conclusion). Third, all the counter-
arguments have to be rebutted (the counter-argument is weaker than the pro-argument)
or undercut (some of the premises of the counter-argument are not provable). In the case
of the derivation of rules using meta-rules, what we have to do is to see when two rules
are in conflict: thus, conflict-detection is based on the notion of incompatibility.
Definition 10 Two non-nested rules r and r′ are incompatible iff r′ is an incompatible
atomic rule of r or r′ is an incompatible negative rule of r.
1. r′ is an incompatible atomic rule of r iff r and r′ are atomic rules and A(r) =
A(r′), C(r) =∼C(r′);
2. r′ is an incompatible negative rule of r iff either r or r′ is not an atomic rule and
A(r) = A(r′), C(r) =C(r′).
The set of all possible incompatible rules for r↪→ is denoted by IC(r↪→) =
{r′|r′ is incompatible with r↪→}.
Example 5 Case 1: r : a ⇒I b and a ⇒I ¬b are incompatible. Case 2: r : a ⇒I b and
¬(r′ : a⇒I b) are incompatible.
Let us state the proof procedures for the defeasible derivation of atomic rules in an
interpretation theory D= (F,RI ,RC,>).
+∂ ↪→C : If P(n+1) = +∂Cr
↪→, then
(1) r↪→ ∈ RI , or
(2) (2.1) ∀r′′ ∈ IC(r↪→), ∀r′ ∈ RCs [r′′], r′ is discarded and
(2.2) ∃t ∈ RC⇒[r↪→]: t is applicable, and
(2.3) ∀r′′ ∈ IC(r↪→),∀s ∈ RC[r′′], either
(2.3.1) s is discarded, or
(2.3.2) ∃z ∈ RC⇒[r′′′]: r′′′ ∈ IC(C(s)), z is applicable and z> s.
The provability condition of −∂ ↪→XC is omitted for space reasons. Suppose we want to
derive r : OBLILS1i (n
LS1
1 ,a) ⇒I ILS2j (nLS22 ,b). We have the following options. Condition
(1): r is in RI ; or, Condition (2): We use a defeasible meta-rule to derive r. This must
exclude, as a precondition, that any rule, which is incompatible with r, is supported:
(condition 2.1). That is, rules such as
r′ : ¬(OBLILS1i (nLS11 ,a)⇒I ILS2j (nLS22 ,b)) r′′ : OBLILS1i (nLS11 ,a)⇒I ILS2j (nLS22 ,d)
r′′′ : OBLILS1i (n
LS1
1 ,a)⇒I ILS2k (nLS22 ,d)
should not be supported.
With this done, condition (2.2) states that there should exist a meta-rule such as
t : d ⇒C (r : OBLILS1i (nLS11 ,a)⇒I ILS2j (nLS22 ,b))
such that t is applicable. But this fact must exclude that any meta-rule s supporting, e.g.,
r′,r′′,r′′′ above is applicable. Alternatively, if s is applicable, we have to verify that there
exists a meta-rule z that proves r, such as
z : e⇒C (r : OBLILS1i (nLS11 ,a)⇒I ILS2j (nLS22 ,b))
such that z is applicable and is stronger that s (see condition 2.3.2).
Given the above proof conditions for deriving non-nested rules, we must also slightly
adjust proof conditions for deriving interpretations of Section 3. The only, but substantial,
difference is that here, each time a rule r is used and applied, we are required to check that
r is provable. Analogously, to discard incompatible rules (when we consider all possible
attacks to the rule we want to use), an additional option is that these incompatible rules
are not provable in the theory.
+∂ IAdm: If P(n+1) = +∂ IAdmφ then
(1) Admφ ∈ F or OBLφ ∈ F , or
(2.1) ∼Admφ ∈ F , and
(2.2) ∃r ∈ RI⇒[φ ]: +∂Cr, r is applicable, and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼φ ], either
(2.3.1) −∂Cs, or
(2.3.2) s is discarded, or
(2.3.3) ∃t ∈ R[φ ,k]: t is applicable and t > s.
Example 6 Let us freely elaborate the case described in Example 1. Suppose that the
domestic literal interpretation of art. 340, Civil Code of Cameroon, returns p, saying
that the judicial declaration of paternity outside marriage refers to a rather minimal idea
of entretien, which can even consist in some discontinuous support. With children under
14, teleological interpretation in Cameroon’s system, instead, would interpret entretien
as regular support (q), but literal interpretation is institutionally preferred. In Italian
private law (art. 147, Italian Civil Code), instead, mantenimento, which corresponds to
entretien, means regular support (q), a reading which depends by coherence on art. 30
of the Italian constitution7. One can argue we should align to the case considered in
Cameroon’s law (under 14) but resorting to an interpretation by coherence that takes
art. 30 of the Italian constitution into account.
F = {OBL ILSitl (art.30LSit ,a)}
RI = {r3 :⇒I ILScaml (art.340LScam , p), r4 : children under14⇒I ILScamt (art.340LScam ,q)
r5 : OBL I
LSit
l (art.30
LSit ,a)⇒I ILSitc (art.147LSit ,q)}
RC = {r6 : OBL ILSitl (art.30LSit ,a)⇒C (r7 : children under14⇒I ILSitc (art.340LScam ,q)}
>= {r3 > r4, r7 > r3}.
r7 is applicable and r7 is provable. This determines a conflict with r3, but r7 is stronger
than r3.
5. Summary
This paper extended [6]’s contribution to explore the feasibility of formal methods for ar-
guing with canons of interpretation coming from different legal systems, once they have
accessed domestic legal systems in private international law disputes. In so doing, we
aimed at defining a logic-based conceptual framework that could encompass the occur-
ring interpretive interactions, without neglecting the existing, broader normative back-
ground each legal system is nowadays part of.
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